Everything we have built, planned, and wired on Helius Privacy Rings (SPR) — the shielded facilitator leg, the indexer client, the DarkSwap shielded swap, and the Dark suite — with honest status labels and the open gaps listed, not hidden.
Status words mean exactly what they say. “Live” settles real value today; “dry-run” is built and verified against live reads but moves nothing.
The working SPR explorer at rings.clawdcompute.us (also rings.musebook.trade) — “every shielded transfer”: live reads against the SPR indexer with the same-origin proxy pattern the DarkSwap plan reuses, so the Helius key never ships to the browser.
The solanaShielded leg of the omni-chain facilitator (face: z.x402.wtf).
SPR deposit detection is built (the rings/ package) and dry-run-verified against live reads.
Crediting stays off until step 2 — the facilitator Private Wallet plus viewing-authority decryption — lands.
Its status is published in the hub’s own discovery document, not just claimed here.
z402/rings/spr-client.mjs — one client for all seven SPR read methods, with the documented
wire shape (method in path and body, single request, error inspected even on HTTP 200, backoff on
-32016). Deposit construction lives beside it in solana/src/rings-deposit.mjs.
A three-leg shielded swap for InferenceSwap: private balance → one-time wallet → public swap → private
balance. The full SPR plan is written — API mapping per step, gateway spr-rail module, proxy
routes that keep the Helius key server-side, credit budgets that fail closed, and the exact disclosure
copy the UI must render. Seven decisions sit with the dev before the build starts.
Dark x402 (shielded machine payments), Dark Perps and Dark Percolator (private perps), and Dark Payments —
one design document (DARK-SUITE.md) over two primitives: SPR for shielded transfers, swaps, and
x402m messaging settlement, and MagicBlock PER for the private-perps side. Design phase only; nothing here
is deployed.
The gateway access page carries a “Shielded · Helius Privacy Rings” cell fed by the access service’s
/privacy/summary endpoint, with the SPR endpoint and view tag held server-side only. Keys are
named, never printed — the same rule this page follows.
Our on/off-ramp mapped against Helius’s Confidential Fiat guide with Crossmint as the confidential on-ramp component: public delivery deposit in, private resulting balance out, ownership proven by message signing, screening on the provider. Known gap, stated plainly: the confidential path is on-ramp only — we have no shielded off-ramp yet.
From Helius’s published SPR documentation, as integrated in our plans. Verify against the live docs before relying on any of it.
| Piece | What it is |
|---|---|
| The privacy model | Confidential transfers hide the asset and the amount; sender and recipient stay public. A private balance works as deposit → private transfer → withdraw in one native Solana transaction. Deposits from a public balance, and withdrawals out, are always public events. |
| Read API (7 methods) | getEncryptedUtxosByTags, getShieldedTransactionsByTags / BySignature / ByNullifiers, getMerkleProofs, getNonInclusionProofs, getUserRecords — JSON-RPC at {mainnet|devnet}.helius-rpc.com/v1/spr/{method}. The API is read-only; spending and decryption happen user-side in the @heliuslabs/spr SDK with the owner’s viewing and signing keys. |
| Credit costs | Reads cost 10 credits; proof generation costs 1,000 credits per proof. Our plans budget proofs as an exception path (high-value receipts, audits), cached by commitment — never in the hot path. |
| Programs (per Helius docs) | Solana Privacy Program ring1GaLCuJnkUMVkX2JeZLTTX17wKsV4fZmPVzXANW · User Registry regy3WAeRXMYuMYxr5iK3Bf9Arr3PcxGxyzAddbiqDQ · State Merkle tree 777pvSGe5LaBd9nCczvE2FXEauiwtfGJ5XRpjKyniGor · native SOL interface PDA CiNmas621VuyofiDSrEPfTXHKrdZuB6jMKECyNiMpLXE. Proofs are generated inside an attested AWS Nitro enclave. |
| Private Wallet keys | Derived deterministically from an Ed25519 signature over TSPP/derive/v1 → HKDF nullifier and viewing keys. That signature is a seed: it is never logged, sent, or stored by any of our services. Viewing keys live user-side, full stop — see the suite’s non-negotiable handling rules. |
| Default Ring vs Custom Rings | The permissionless Default Ring is live on mainnet (launched Nov 10, 2026). Custom Rings — configurable confidential-vs-anonymous sets with whitelist/blocklist, freeze, co-sign, and auditor controls — are the institutional tier, in audit with a Q4 2026 target per Helius. The embedded Private Wallet (Helius WaaS) is not live yet. |
| Underneath it all | Our fleet already runs on Helius in production: mainnet RPC + WSS for balances, buys, and the situation-room monitor, and DAS asset reads for the Musebook directory. SPR is the privacy layer on top of a pipe we already trust with live traffic. |
What we would enter, and exactly what stands between here and a credible entry.
Language rule we hold ourselves to, from the DarkSwap plan: the confidential tier supports “shielded” and “encrypted amounts” — never “anonymous”, “untraceable”, or “hidden trade”. If a claim can’t survive a read of the chain, it doesn’t go on the page.